看大片电影，学舞弊知识

Indeed, much of Gibney’s style of documentary filming parallels what happens in investigative journalism. In his 2021 two-part documentary about the opioid epidemic, “The Crime of the Century,” Gibney worked with Washington Post reporters and unearthed new evidence to show how drug companies were responsible for the drug crisis. (See “Opioid Crisis: Filmmaker Details The Medical System’s ‘Crime of the Century,’” by Rachel Martin, Phil Harrell, H.J. Mai and James Doubek, NPR, May 10, 2021.)

事实上，吉布尼的大部分纪录片拍摄风格与调查性新闻中发生的事情相似。在他 2021 年关于阿片类药物流行的两集纪录片《世纪之罪》中，吉布尼与《华盛顿邮报》记者合作，挖掘出新的证据来证明制药公司对毒品危机负有责任。（参见“阿片类药物危机：电影制片人详细介绍医疗系统的‘世纪之罪’”，Rachel Martin、Phil Harrell、HJ Mai 和 James Doubek，NPR，2021 年 5 月 10 日。）

“I sometimes quip that I am a filmmaker with journalistic baggage,” says Gibney. “I am making films but a lot of the work we do is very similar to what you would do in investigative journalism.”

“我有时会打趣说，我是一名背负着新闻包袱的电影制片人，”吉布尼说。“我正在制作电影，但我们所做的很多工作都与你在调查性新闻中所做的非常相似。”

In “The Crime of the Century” he brings new documents and unseen footage that adds validity to the underlying theme of the documentary. This includes a 2015 deposition of Richard Sackler, chairman and president of Purdue Pharma, emails obtained by the filmmakers showing that executives actively concealed their knowledge about the addictive properties of OxyContin and details of how Purdue sat down for three days in a motel with then-director of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Curtis Wright, to get approval for the broader use of the painkilling drug. Soon thereafter Wright nabbed a $400,000 job with Purdue. (See “‘Crime of the Century’ Review: Manufacturing the Opioid Epidemic,” by John Anderson, The Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2021, and “‘The Crime of the Century’: Opioid Doc’s 10 Most Shocking Revelations,” by Alex Noble, The Wrap, May 11, 2021.)

在“世纪之罪”中，他带来了新的记录和看不见的镜头，为纪录片的基本主题增添了有效性。这包括 2015 年普渡制药公司董事长兼总裁理理查德·萨克勒的证词，电影制片人获得的电子邮件显示，高管们积极隐瞒了他们对奥施康定成瘾特性的了解，以及普渡如何在一家汽车旅馆坐了三天的细节，当时——美国食品和药物管理局 (FDA) 主任柯蒂斯·赖特 (Curtis Wright) 获得批准更广泛地使用这种止痛药。此后不久，赖特在普渡获得了一份价值 40 万美元的工作。（参见“‘世纪之罪’评论：制造阿片类药物流行病”，约翰·安德森，华尔街日报，2021 年 5 月 6 日，以及"“世纪之罪”：阿片类药物医生的 10 项最令人震惊的启示，”作者 Alex Noble，The Wrap，2021 年 5 月 11 日。）

Gibney’s documentaries arguably impact and ultimately engage a larger audience than traditional media could ever do, and in turn bring greater awareness about fraud by entertainingly providing an unvarnished look at fraudsters and how difficult it can be to bring perpetrators to justice.

吉布尼的纪录片可以说影响并最终吸引了比传统媒体所能做的更多的观众，反过来，通过有趣地提供对舞弊者的朴实看法以及将犯罪者绳之以法的难度，从而提高了人们对舞弊的认识。

“My dad was a print journalist, and he wanted me to go into the family business, but ultimately I chose filmmaking in part because you reach more people,” he says.

“我父亲是一名印刷记者，他希望我进入家族企业，但最终我选择了电影制作，部分原因是因为你可以接触到更多的人，”他说。

“That raises the question of whether you can make (these documentaries) in a way that is just more than imparting information. It is engaging viewers emotionally in narratives that are compelling even if they are not necessarily interested in the technical aspects of the subject. In other words, I have never thought it was a bad thing to be entertaining.”

“这提出了一个问题，即你是否可以以一种不仅仅是传递信息的方式制作（这些纪录片）。即使观众不一定对主题的技术方面感兴趣，它也会让观众在情感上参与到引人入胜的叙事中。换句话说，我从来没有觉得具有娱乐性是一件坏事。”

Indeed, Gibney’s documentaries are both informative and entertaining, not least because of the psychological portraits he paints of his subjects and the insights into why they commit fraud. Whether it’s the tape recordings of the Enron energy traders cheering about how they’re taking down the California energy grid, Richard Sackler’s deadpan expression during his deposition or how former sales executive at Insys Therapeutics, Alec Burlakoff, describes bribing doctors to peddle its fentanyl drug, they provide windows into the psyche of people who, under the right circumstances, are willing to cross the line into fraudulent territory.

的确，吉布尼的纪录片内容丰富且娱乐性强，尤其是因为他为拍摄对象描绘的心理画像以及对他们为什么会舞弊的洞察力。无论是安然能源交易员为他们如何摧毁加利福尼亚能源网而欢呼的录音，还是理查德萨克勒在证词期间的面无表情，或者是 Insys Therapeutics 的前销售主管亚历克·伯拉科夫（Alec Burlakoff）如何描述贿赂医生以兜售芬太尼药物，它们为那些在适当情况下愿意越界进入舞弊领域的人提供了心灵的窗口。

“I am not just interested in the evidence of fraud itself, but also in the psychology of fraud,” he says. “And I think that is different than what you would do for a daily newspaper.”

“我不仅对舞弊的证据本身感兴趣，而且对舞弊的心理也很感兴趣，”他说。“我认为这和你为一家日报所做的事情有所不同。”

In his 2019 documentary about Holmes, “The Inventor: Out for Blood in Silicon Valley,” Gibney takes the concept that people are more inclined to lie if they believe they’re working toward a noble cause. And he suggests that this type of reasoning was part of Holmes’ mental process as she strove to build a product that could accurately run hundreds of medical tests on a single drop of blood and revolutionize this corner of the health care market. That wasn’t to be, however, and was never really feasible with the use of existing technology, according to experts. (See “Theranos’s invention never would have worked. Here’s why,” The Verge, Episode 2, YouTube, Dec. 30, 2021.)

在他 2019 年关于霍尔姆斯的纪录片《发明家：硅谷的鲜血》中，吉布尼提出了这样一个概念，即如果人们认为自己正在为一项崇高的事业而努力，他们就更倾向于撒谎。他认为，这种推理是霍尔姆斯心理过程的一部分，因为她努力开发一种产品，可以准确地对一滴血进行数百次医学测试，并彻底改变医疗保健市场的这个角落。然而，据专家称，这是不可行的，而且在使用现有技术的情况下从未真正可行。（请参阅“ Theranos 的发明永远不会奏效。这就是为什么”，The Verge，第 2 集，YouTube，2021 年 12 月 30 日。）

Gibney says a character like Bernie Madoff, who very consciously committed fraud daily for financial gain through his Ponzi scheme, held less interest for him than Holmes. Even though she knew her product wasn’t delivering accurate diagnostic information, she’d convinced herself that her cause was noble, and the ends justified the means.

吉布尼说，像伯尼·马多夫这样的人物，每天都有意识地通过庞氏骗局进行欺诈以获取经济利益，对他的兴趣比霍尔姆斯要少。尽管她知道自己的产品不能提供准确的诊断信息，但她相信自己的事业是崇高的，目的证明了手段的正当性。

That warped altruistic attitude seems to have motivated many of Gibney’s subjects. For example, Richard Sackler argued that Purdue aggressively peddled OxyContin to help Americans in pain. And Enron CEO Jeff Skilling believed that unfettered free markets were a catalyst for social good.

这种扭曲的利他态度似乎激发了吉布尼的许多研究对象。例如，理查德萨克勒辩称，普渡积极兜售奥施康定，以帮助陷入痛苦的美国人。安然首席执行官杰夫斯基林认为，不受约束的自由市场是社会公益的催化剂。

“Most people want to believe that there are good people and there are bad people, and that the fraudsters know they are committing a terrible crime and do it anyway, like the Mafia,” says Gibney. “But what I have discovered that generally speaking in corporate fraud that is not the case at all — from Enron to Theranos. People who commit fraud feel they are entitled to do so to reach that noble goal, and that is what allows fraud to happen because everyone believes they are a good guy; otherwise, you are a professional criminal.”

吉布尼说：“大多数人都想相信有好人和坏人，骗子知道他们犯了可怕的罪行，就像黑手党一样做。”“但我发现，一般来说，对于公司舞弊，从安然到Theranos，根本不是这样。实施舞弊的人觉得他们有权这样做以达到崇高的目标，这使得舞弊得以发生，因为每个人都相信自己是好人；否则，你就是一个职业罪犯。”

Holmes also wove a convincing and uplifting story about revolutionizing the health care industry and helping ordinary Americans through this new technology she was developing. And she was hardly unique among startups in spinning an alluring narrative to bring in new capital. Hype is an integral component of the tech scene in Silicon Valley startups, and Holmes is in some ways indistinguishable from many young ambitious entrepreneurs.

霍尔姆斯还创造了一个令人信服和令人振奋的故事，关于彻底改变医疗保健行业，并通过她正在开发的新技术帮助普通美国人。在初创公司中，她并没有通过一个诱人的故事来引入新资本。炒作是硅谷初创公司科技领域不可或缺的一个组成部分，而霍尔姆斯在某些方面与许多年轻的雄心勃勃的企业家没有什么区别。

But while many of those startups have also fallen victim to fraud, Theranos and Elizabeth Holmes captured the public and investors’ imaginations, partly because, as Gibney points out, she was a young woman succeeding spectacularly in the male-dominated Silicon Valley. (See “16 of The Biggest Alleged Startup Frauds of All Time,” CB Insights, Research Briefs, May 23, 2019.)

但是，尽管其中许多初创公司也成为舞弊的受害者，但 Theranos 和 伊丽莎白·霍尔姆斯 吸引了公众和投资者的想象力，部分原因是，正如吉布尼指出的那样，她是一名年轻女性，在男性主导的硅谷取得了惊人的成功。（请参阅“有史以来最大的 16 起初创公司舞弊案”，CB Insights，研究简报，2019 年 5 月 23 日。）

Indeed, Holmes pulled the wool over the eyes of some very sophisticated politicians and investors. To name just a few, media magnate Rupert Murdoch and two former U.S secretaries of state — George Shultz and Henry Kissinger — all initially bought her pitch. Then-President Barack Obama even made Holmes a U.S. ambassador for global entrepreneurship. (See “The White House Celebrates Entrepreneurs Around the World,” by Jenna Brayton, The White House Blog, May 11, 2015, and “How Elizabeth Holmes convinced powerful men like Henry Kissinger, James Mattis, and George Shultz to sit on the board of the now disgraced blood-testing startup Theranos,” by Lydia Ramsey Pflanzer, Insider, March 19, 2019.)

事实上，霍尔姆斯欺骗了一些非常老练的政客和投资者的眼睛。举几个例子吧，媒体大亨鲁伯特·默多克和两位前美国国务卿乔治·舒尔茨和亨利·基辛格最初都接受了她的主张。当时的总统奥巴马甚至让霍姆斯成为美国全球创业大使。（参见“白宫庆祝世界各地的企业家，”詹娜·布雷顿，白宫博客，5月11日，2015年，和“伊丽莎白·霍尔姆斯说服强大的男人像亨利·基辛格，詹姆斯·马蒂斯和乔治·舒尔茨坐在董事会现在名誉扫地的血液化验启动Theranos，”莉迪亚·拉姆齐泽，内幕，2019年3月19日。）

“One of Elizabeth’s great skills — and one often admired by entrepreneurs — was that she was a magnificent storyteller,” Gibney says. “She could tell a great story about herself that was inspiring and made people want to invest in it. There was willful denial because they wanted to believe her story.”

“伊丽莎白的一项伟大技能——也是企业家经常钦佩的一项——是她是一位出色的讲故事的人，”吉布尼说。“她可以讲述一个关于她自己的精彩故事，这个故事鼓舞人心，让人们想要投资。他们故意否认，因为他们想相信她的故事。”

Some critics said Gibney should’ve been harder on Holmes and called out the fraud in stronger terms rather than focus on Silicon Valley’s well-known “fake it until you make it” culture, her belief in a noble cause and how she modeled her career on storied inventor Thomas Edison, who sometimes lied to the public until his inventions worked. But Gibney thinks these critics are missing the point. (See “In The Inventor, Alex Gibney Goes Shockingly Soft on Alleged Theranos Fraud Elizabeth Holmes,” by Amy Glynn, Paste, March 18, 2019.)

一些批评者说，吉布尼应该对霍尔姆斯更加严厉，并用更强烈的措辞来指责舞弊行为，而不是关注硅谷众所周知的“假装成功”文化、她对崇高事业的信念以及她如何塑造自己的职业生涯关于著名的发明家托马斯·爱迪生，他有时会向公众撒谎，直到他的发明奏效。但吉布尼认为这些批评者没有抓住重点。（参见“在发明家中，亚历克斯·吉布尼对所谓的 Theranos 舞弊伊丽莎白·霍尔姆斯的态度令人震惊”，作者：Amy Glynn，Paste，2019 年 3 月 18 日。）

“I don’t think that is letting anyone off the hook,” he says. “It is actually more terrifying because it means that every company can have someone who thinks they are a good guy, but to achieve their goals, which were perhaps unreasonably set by higher management, they engage in fraud.”

“我认为这不会让任何人摆脱困境，”他说。“这实际上更可怕，因为这意味着每家公司都可以有人认为自己是个好人，但为了实现他们的目标，这些目标可能是由更高管理层设定的不合理的，他们从事舞弊行为。”

Gibney says he consistently sees fraud cases at companies with poor tone at the top — a concept familiar to fraud examiners. “One of the issues I see over and over again in these big fraud cases is that you generally don’t find it to be a case of a few bad apples,” he says. “Usually, you find that good people end up becoming corrupt, in part, because of the kinds of incentive put in place by higher management.”

吉布尼说，他经常看到公司高层基调不佳的舞弊案件——这是舞弊审查师熟悉的概念。“在这些大型舞弊案件中，我一遍又一遍地看到的一个问题是，你通常不会发现这是几个坏苹果的案例，”他说。“通常情况下，你会发现好人最终会变得腐败，部分原因是高级管理层采取的激励措施。”

Gibney gives the example of Volkswagen’s drive to become the No. 1 automaker in the U.S., and, in the process, how the German car manufacturer was caught in 2015 installing so-called defeat devices to cheat emissions tests — a story he tells in a 2018 investigative documentary called “Hard NOx.” (See “Dirty Money review – Alex Gibney left choking with rage by VW,” by Sam Wollaston, The Guardian, Jan. 27, 2018.)

吉布尼举了大众汽车成为美国No.1汽车制造商的例子，在这个过程中，这家德国汽车制造商是如何在2015年安装所谓的失败装置来欺骗排放测试的——他在2018年一部名为“硬氮氧化物”的调查纪录片中讲述了这个故事。（参见《卫报》2018年1月27日，山姆·沃拉斯顿的《脏钱评论-亚历克斯·吉布尼因愤怒而离开》。）

“The thinking was we will solve this problem but for now — because our bosses say we have to launch — we’ll come up with this cheat,” he says. “We won’t even call it a cheat. It is something we’ll have to do for now, but we’ll fix it later.”

“我们的想法是我们会解决这个问题，但现在——因为我们的老板说我们必须推出——我们会想出这个骗局，”他说。“我们甚至不会称其为作弊。这是我们现在必须做的事情，但我们稍后会解决它。”

This wink-and-nod culture often causes massive frauds, such as Volkswagen’s emissions scandal. But the resulting executive corporate-speak about achieving goals and beating the competition rather than explicit statements of wrongdoing can impede clear-cut criminal prosecutions.

这种眨眼和点头的文化经常导致大规模的舞弊行为，例如大众汽车的排放丑闻。但由此产生的高管公司谈论实现目标和击败竞争对手，而不是明确陈述不法行为，这可能会阻碍明确的刑事起诉。

“Not surprisingly you look for the smoking gun and you say where is the piece of paper where the boss says, ‘Please cheat’? I haven’t seen documents from Volkswagen’s president to its engineers saying, ‘Please commit massive fraud so we can capture the American market,’” says Gibney.

“毫不奇怪，你寻找确凿证据，然后说老板说‘请作弊’的那张纸在哪里？我还没有看到大众汽车总裁向其工程师发出的文件说，'请进行大规模舞弊，这样我们才能占领美国市场，'”吉布尼说。

“Well, it is often not there, but there is an expectation to do whatever you [need] to do to get this done, and that sometimes translates into terrible things.”

嗯，它通常不在那里，但人们期望你能做任何你 [需要] 做的事情来完成这件事，这有时会变成可怕的事情。”

Indeed, the process of holding perpetrators accountable is fraught with challenges in a system that at times benefits the wealthy and the powerful, as “The Crime of the Century,” illustrates so well.

事实上，追究犯罪者责任的过程充满了挑战，在一个有时有利于富人和有权势的系统中，正如“世纪之罪”所展示的那样。

The film shows that while prosecutors in 2006 had recommended indicting Purdue of mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering and conspiracy, the drug company ultimately got a slap on the wrist in 2007 when three executives pleaded guilty to “misbranding,” and the parent company agreed to pay $600 million in fines and other payments. (See “In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million,” by Barry Meier, The New York Times, May 10, 2007, and “Purdue Pharma escaped serious charges over opioid in 2006, memo shows,” by Edward Helmore, The Guardian, Aug. 19, 2020.)

这部电影显示，虽然检察官在 2006 年曾建议起诉普渡的邮件舞弊、电信舞弊、洗钱和阴谋，但这家制药公司最终在 2007 年受到了打击，当时三名高管承认犯有“品牌错误”，和母公司同意支付6亿美元的罚款和其他支付。（见《纽约时报》2007年5月10日的《奥施康定制造商支付6亿美元》，以及《卫报》2020年8月19日的爱德华·赫尔莫的《2006年阿片类药物严重指控》。）

It wasn’t for another decade or so that Purdue was finally forced into bankruptcy in September 2019 due to lawsuits over the opioid crisis, and a month later pleaded guilty to criminal charges relating to the marketing of OxyContin, including conspiracy to defraud the U.S. in violations of the anti-kickback statute. In March, it reached a nationwide settlement of more than $10 billion, with as much as $6 billion to come from the Sackler family. The agreement shields the Sacklers from more civil litigation but not from criminal suits. (See “Sacklers and Purdue Pharma Reach New Deal With States Over Opioids,” by Jan Hoffman, The New York Times, March 3, 2022, and “The role of the Purdue Pharma and the Sackler Family in the Opioid Epidemic,” hearing before Congressional Committee, U.S. Government Publishing Office, Dec. 17, 2020.)

再过十年左右，普渡最终于2019年9月因类阿片危机而被迫破产，一个月后，普渡承认了与OxyContin营销相关的刑事指控，包括阴谋欺骗美国违反《反回扣法》。今年3月，它在全国范围内达成了100多亿美元的和解协议，其中多达60亿美元来自萨克勒家族。该协议保护萨克勒夫妇免受更多民事诉讼，但不受刑事诉讼的影响。（参见Jan Hoffman于2022年3月3日在《纽约时报》发表的“Sackler和Purdue Pharma就类阿片与各州达成新政”，以及“Purdue Pharma和Sackler家族在类阿片流行中的作用”，国会委员会听证会，美国政府出版局，2020年12月17日。）

Prior to Purdue’s demise, however, other drug companies, encouraged by the relatively mild rebuke given to Purdue in its 2007 settlement, looked to cash in on the sale of opioids and turned a blind eye to the distributors and doctors who were failing to follow prescription laws.

然而，在普渡倒闭之前，其他制药公司受到普渡在 2007 年和解中相对温和的谴责的鼓舞，希望从阿片类药物的销售中获利，并对未能遵守处方的分销商和医生视而不见法律。

As retold in “The Crime of the Century,” Joe Rannazzisi, a DEA agent who ran the drug diversion division, warned pharmaceutical firms of unusually large shipments of opioids that were likely going onto the black market. He looked to crack down on suspicious opioid orders only to have politicians amend the Controlled Substances Act through the Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act (EPAEDEA) to make it more difficult to immediately shut down suspicious drug distribution networks following heavy lobbying by the pharmaceutical industry. He was eventually forced out of the agency in 2015. [See “Who is Joe Rannazzisi: The DEA man who fought the drug companies and lost,” by Scott Higham and Lenny Bernstein, The Washington Post, Oct. 15, 2017, and “Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act (EPAEDEA) of 2016,” Congress.gov, April 19, 2016.]

正如《世纪之罪》中重述的那样，负责毒品转移部门的 DEA 特工乔·兰纳齐西警告制药公司，阿片类药物的出货量异常大，可能会进入黑市。他希望打击可疑的阿片类药物订单，只是为了让政客通过《确保患者获取和有效药物执行法》（EPAEDEA）修改《受控物质法》，以便在制药公司的大力游说之后立即关闭可疑的药物分销网络变得更加困难。行业。他最终于 2015 年被迫离开该机构。[参见“谁是 Joe Rannazzisi：与制药公司作战并失败的 DEA 人”，Scott Higham 和 Lenny Bernstein，华盛顿邮报，2017 年 10 月 15 日，以及“2016 年确保患者获取和有效药物执法法案 (EPAEDEA)，”Congress.gov，2016 年 4 月 19 日。]

According to The Washington Post article, the new law changed four decades of DEA practice with a few words. The DEA could previously freeze drug shipments that posed an “imminent danger” to the community. The Controlled Substances Act law now says that the DEA must demonstrate that a company’s actions represent “a substantial likelihood of an immediate threat” — a much higher bar.

根据《华盛顿邮报》的文章，新法律仅用几句话就改变了 4 年的 DEA 实践。DEA 之前可以冻结对社区构成“迫在眉睫的危险”的毒品运输。《受控物质法》现在规定，DEA 必须证明公司的行为代表“直接威胁的很大可能性”——这是一个更高的标准。

The bill was passed by unanimous vote, and it’s clear that some politicians were unaware of the impact the new wording would have on DEA enforcement, despite Rannazzisi’s very public warnings.

该法案以全票通过，尽管 Rannazzisi 非常公开地发出警告，但一些政客显然没有意识到新措辞对 DEA 执法的影响。

“I went on an Al Franken podcast, who had been a senator at the time, and he didn’t realize [the true impact of the bill’s new wording], which is how lobbyists work their magic,” says Gibney. (See “Alex Gibney Talks Opioids & His Doc ‘The Crime of the Century,’” the Al Franken Podcast, posted on Sept. 19, 2021.)

吉布尼说：“我看了艾尔·弗兰肯的播客，他当时是参议员，他没有意识到法案新措辞的真正影响，这就是游说者如何发挥他们的魔力。”（参见“亚历克斯·吉布尼谈论阿片类药物和他的医生“世纪之罪”，”阿尔·弗兰肯播客，发布于2021年9月19日。）

Bubbling underneath Gibney’s documentaries is a sense that untethered markets help encourage modern-day capitalism to run amok and in turn cause massive frauds that policymakers and regulators can help deter if they take a more hands-on approach. Gibney doesn’t necessarily disagree and has said as much in other interviews. (See “Alex Gibney on Why He Takes on the Opioid Crisis in ‘The Crime of the Century’ Documentary,” by Katie Kilkenny, The Hollywood Reporter, June 10, 2021.)

在吉布尼的纪录片背后冒出这样一种感觉，即不受约束的市场有助于鼓励现代资本主义肆虐，反过来又会导致大规模的舞弊行为，如果政策制定者和监管机构采取更加亲力亲为的方式，他们可以帮助阻止这些舞弊行为。吉布尼不一定不同意，他在其他采访中也说过同样的话。（参见“亚历克斯·吉布尼（Alex Gibney）在‘世纪之罪’纪录片中为何应对阿片类药物危机”，好莱坞报道者凯蒂·基尔肯尼（Katie Kilkenny），2021 年 6 月 10 日。）

“I do think that is a problem,” he says. “The market encourages incredible innovation, but once you decide that the only thing that is important is the bottom line … then other values fall by the wayside.”

“我确实认为这是一个问题，”他说。“市场鼓励令人难以置信的创新，但一旦你决定唯一重要的是底线……那么其他价值就会被搁置一旁。”

The view that a public company’s No. 1 job is to deliver returns to its shareholders can be particularly damaging and act as a justification for fraudulent activity and other wrongdoing, argues Gibney.

吉布尼认为，上市公司的第一要务是为股东提供回报的观点可能特别具有破坏性，并成为舞弊活动和其他不法行为的正当理由。

“That wasn’t always the view, but that has become the view, and in that context, whatever you have to do to make money is OK,” he says. “My professor used to say that economic man is not rational, but a rationalizer. And so, you have these rationalizations.” (See “Economic Man,” by Will Kenton, Investopedia, June 7, 2020.)

“这并不总是这种观点，但这已经成为一种观点，在这种情况下，无论你做什么来赚钱都是可以的，”他说。“我的教授曾经说过，经济人不是理性的，而是理性主义者。所以，你有这些合理化。” （参见“经济人”，Will Kenton，Investopedia，2020 年 6 月 7 日。）

Exposing wrongdoing and ultimately preventing fraud — a key tenet of ACFE’s founder and Chairman Dr. Joseph T. Wells, CFE, CPA — is often difficult in such an environment. But sometimes it’s a matter of asking the simple questions, says Gibney. In the case of Enron, no one had truly tried to pull back the curtain on the energy company’s complex finances and CFO Andrew Fastow’s maze of off-balance sheet special purpose vehicles that concealed mountains of debt and worthless assets from investors. That is until Fortune magazine reporter Bethany McLean confronted Enron CEO Jeff Skilling and other executives and asked just how the company made so much money.

在这样的环境下，揭露不法行为并最终防止舞弊——ACFE 创始人兼董事长 Joseph T. Wells 博士、CFE、注册会计师的一个关键原则——通常是困难的。但有时只是问一些简单的问题，吉布尼说。就安然而言，没有人真正试图揭开这家能源公司复杂的财务状况以及首席财务官安德鲁·法斯托（Andrew Fastow）的表外特殊用途工具的迷宫，这些工具向投资者隐瞒了大量的债务和毫无价值的资产。直到《财富》杂志记者 Bethany McLean 与安然首席执行官杰夫·斯基林 (Jeff Skilling) 和其他高管对质，并询问该公司是如何赚到这么多钱的。

“Nobody had bothered to ask that fundamental question because the Enron folks were so good at bluffing: ‘If you have to ask me that question you are not smart enough,’” says Gibney. “No one wants to feel stupid.”

“没有人费心问这个基本问题，因为安然公司的人非常擅长虚张声势：'如果你不得不问我这个问题，你就不够聪明，'”吉布尼说。“没有人愿意感到愚蠢。”

Thankfully, McLean, a former banking analyst at Goldman Sachs, was smart enough to ask the simple question and write an article published under the rather innocuous title “Is Enron Overpriced?” That question is commonly applied to stocks the world over, but for Enron it lit a spark on Wall Street that burned down the energy company’s flimsy edifice. [See “Is Enron Overpriced? (Fortune 2001)” by Bethany McLean, Fortune, Dec. 30, 2015.]

值得庆幸的是，前高盛银行分析师麦克莱恩足够聪明，他提出了一个简单的问题，并以相当无害的标题“安然定价过高吗？”发表了一篇文章。这个问题通常适用于世界各地的股票，但对于安然来说，它点燃了华尔街的火花，烧毁了能源公司脆弱的大厦。[参见“安然定价过高吗？（财富 2001 年） ”，Bethany McLean，财富，2015 年 12 月 30 日。]

Similarly, Elizabeth Holmes spun a good story about her blood-testing devices — dubbed “Nanotainer” and “Edison machine” — and how a simple finger prick would suffice to run blood tests for various diseases. She often obfuscated more fundamental questions by selling people on how painless and easy the process was. (See “How Theranos’ faulty blood tests got to market – and what that shows about gaps in FDA regulation,” by Ana Santos Rutschman, The Conversation, Oct. 5, 2021.)

同样，伊丽莎白霍姆斯编造了一个关于她的血液检测设备的好故事——被称为“纳米容器”和“爱迪生机器”——以及一个简单的手指刺如何足以对各种疾病进行血液检测。她经常通过向人们推销这个过程是多么轻松和容易来混淆更基本的问题。（请参阅“ Theranos 的错误血液测试如何进入市场——以及这表明 FDA 监管方面的差距”，Ana Santos Rutschman，The Conversation，2021 年 10 月 5 日。）

“She sold them on ideas like some people are terrified of needles,” says Gibney. “But there are some very good reasons why you don’t get enough information when you draw blood from a finger prick. When somebody has a disease, it is better to have more information, not less, right? Nobody asked that fundamental question.”

“她以某些人害怕针头的想法出售它们，”吉布尼说。“但是，当您从手指刺中抽血时，您没有得到足够的信息是有一些很好的理由的。当某人患有疾病时，最好有更多的信息，而不是更少，对吧？没有人问过这个基本问题。”

However, those people who do ask those questions in an effort to expose fraud and other types of wrongdoing still struggle to find a sympathetic ear despite the growing list of laws to encourage and protect whistleblowers.

然而，尽管鼓励和保护举报人的法律越来越多，但那些为了揭露舞弊和其他类型的不法行为而提出这些问题的人仍然难以找到同情的耳朵。

Nor are whistleblowers lionized as much as some might think, says Gibney, recalling the reactions from people during the publicity tour for his documentary on Enron. “I would always get asked at almost every venue, ‘What is it with this Sherron Watkins? How come she thinks she is so great?’” he remembers.

吉布尼回忆起他关于安然的纪录片宣传之旅期间人们的反应时说，举报人也没有像某些人想象的那样受到高度重视。“我几乎在每个场地都会被问到，‘这个 Sherron Watkins 是怎么回事？她怎么会认为自己如此伟大？'”他回忆道。

The audience’s often dismissive observations of Watkins, the internal whistleblower whose brave efforts to warn about the accounting scandal fell on deaf ears, stood in contrast to the intense curiosity about Lou Pai, the Enron executive who cashed in on millions of dollars in stock just before the company collapsed and evaded federal prosecution. (See “Lou Pai, Enron’s Elusive Mystery Man,” by Madeleine Brand, NPR, Day to Day, May 17, 2006.)

观众对沃特金斯（Watkins）的经常不屑一顾的观察，这位内部举报人勇敢地警告会计丑闻的努力被置若罔闻，与对卢派的强烈好奇心形成鲜明对比，卢派是安然高管，就在之前套现了数百万美元的股票该公司倒闭并逃避了联邦起诉。（参见“ Lou Pai，安然难以捉摸的神秘人”，Madeleine Brand，NPR，日常，2006 年 5 月 17 日。）

“That gives you a sense of what the audience is really interested in: No. 1, where is the guidebook so I can end up like Lou Pai, and No. 2, there must be something about Sherron Watkins because she made everyone look bad by being a whistleblower,” says Gibney. “That doesn’t look so good for the public.”

“这让你知道观众真正感兴趣的是什么：第一，指南在哪里，所以我可以像娄排一样结束，第二，雪伦沃特金斯一定有什么东西，因为她让每个人都看起来很糟糕通过成为举报人，”吉布尼说。“这对公众来说看起来不太好。”

Even so, the public seems to love stories about scammers as more and more films and documentaries on this topic are released. This year alone, Netflix has produced a string of fraudster-themed titles, such as “Tinder Swindler,” “Bad Vegan” and “Inventing Anna,” while Hulu premiered its miniseries about the Theranos scandal, “The Dropout.”

即便如此，随着越来越多关于这个话题的电影和纪录片上映，公众似乎喜欢关于舞弊者的故事。仅今年一年，Netflix 就制作了一系列以舞弊者为主题的影片，《流浪者》、《坏素食主义者》和《发明安娜》，而Hulu则推出了关于塞拉诺斯丑闻的迷你剧《辍学生》。

More are on the way, including one from Gibney who says he’s working on another film about fraud. “There is a big one I am working on, but it is premature to say anything,” he says. It seems we’ll have to wait to find out more in the next installment of Gibney’s illustrious career.

更多的电影即将上映，其中包括一部来自吉布尼的电影，他说他正在拍摄另一部关于舞弊的电影。他说：“我正在研究一个大项目，但现在发言还为时过早。”看来我们必须等到吉布尼辉煌的职业生涯的下一期中才能阿看到更多。